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Future Recession Risks: An Update 
BY TRAVIS J. BERGE, EARLY ELIAS, AND ÒSCAR JORDÀ 
  In 2010, statistical experiments based on components of the Conference Board’s Leading 
Economic Index showed a significant possibility of a U.S. recession over a 24-month period. 
Since then, the European sovereign debt crisis has aggravated international threats to the U.S. 
economy. Moreover, the Japanese earthquake and tsunami demonstrated that the U.S. 
economy is vulnerable to outside disruptions. Updated forecasts suggest that the probability of 
a U.S. recession has remained elevated and may have increased over the past year, in part 
because of foreign financial and economic crises. 
 
Gathering storms across the Atlantic threaten a U.S. economy not yet recovered from the last recession. 
The September Economic Outlook from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) indicates that growth prospects have significantly dimmed for major industrialized economies 
(OECD 2011). Growth in the G-7 countries is expected to remain below 1% for the rest of the year, while 
the odds of a contraction are fifty-fifty. The semiannual Global Financial Stability Report of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlights risks the European sovereign debt crisis poses to the 
stability of the financial system (IMF 2011a). The crisis has resulted in escalating volatility in equity 
markets and the lowest interest rates on long-term U.S. Treasury securities since the 1940s. In its World 
Economic Outlook, the IMF sees the softening U.S. economy and the euro area fiscal crisis as the two 
major factors threatening the world economy (IMF 2011b). 
On cue, economic forecasters have been flourishing their recession trumpets, sounding a symphony of 
predictions that put the odds of a U.S. recession in the neighborhood of one in three over the next twelve 
months. In this Economic Letter, we join this ensemble, updating the recession probabilities provided 
last year in Berge and Jordà (2010). In that Economic Letter, we put the odds of recession at about one 
in three by the end of the summer of 2011, rising to even odds of one in two toward the first half of 2012. 
Measured by the growing number of forecasters who now share our views, these predictions have held 
up well. 
Since the summer of 2010, the situation on the ground has changed. Japan’s March 2011 earthquake and 
tsunami disrupted supply chains in the U.S. automobile industry far more than expected. Meanwhile, the 
deteriorating fiscal realities in Europe have been keeping many a trader awake at night, reliving the 
nightmare of the near-collapse of financial markets in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The 
European situation was highlighted by the September 2011 release of the euro zone purchasing managers 
index data, which indicated that the manufacturing and services sectors contracted in August. Christine 
Lagarde, the IMF’s managing director, sounded the financial alarm by suggesting that European banks 
are in “urgent need of capital” in a speech on August 27 at the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Economic 
Policy Symposium.    




This Economic Letter revises the recession odds calculated in 2010 to account for these international 
factors. Viewed through the domestic lens, the immediate risks of recession appear to be low, but 
gradually increasing. International risks, though less precisely measured, are the mirror image. Risks are 
highest in the very short run, but then fade. In combination, the data suggest vigilance. The U.S. 
economy is fragile with limited ability to withstand shocks. Yet, as the economy strengthens, recession 
risks will gradually abate beginning in the second half of 2012. 
Updating the recession odds based on the leading indicators index 
Why should anyone care about dating expansions and recessions? When millions of workers are unable 
to find a job during a period of expansion, it seems little more than an academic exercise. It would be 
more compelling to quantify the odds that the rate of GDP growth will exceed a level at which the jobs 
picture can reasonably be expected to improve, say, 2%. 
However, identifying business cycle turning points is useful. From an operational viewpoint, predicting a 
binary outcome—recession or expansion—over a long forecast horizon is easier than predicting GDP. 
Moreover, certain variables, such as leading economic indicators, offer insight into recession odds in the 
distant future. If economic policy is to be preemptive rather than reactive, it is important to get ahead of 
the curve. 
In Berge and Jordà (2010), we used the components of the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Index 
(LEI) (www.conference-board.org/data/bci.cfm) to forecast the odds of recession. We assembled 
different LEI indexes based on weighted averages of the components, tailored to reflect that different 
variables have predictive power at different horizons. 
Historically, the interest spread between the federal funds rate and the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury 
bond had been one of the better predictors of turning points. But the extraordinary combination of the 
federal funds rate stuck near its zero lower bound and extremely low Treasury bond yields, reflecting 
uncertainty about European sovereign debt more than domestic fundamentals, have kept the spread 
unusually narrow. We continue to view this signal as misleading in the current environment and have 
chosen to drop it from the update, just as we did in 2010. 
One way to assess the accuracy of predictions about turning points is to rely on a statistic that has a long 
tradition in biostatistics and medicine called the area under the curve (AUC). The AUC is a number 
between 0.5, a prediction no better than a coin toss, and 1, a perfect sorting of recessions and 
expansions. One interpretation of the AUC is as the average correct classification rates of observations as 
either expansions or recessions (for more on the AUC, see Berge and Jordà 2011). 
At the short end of our 24-month forecasting exercise, the AUC is 0.99, which means we can almost 
perfectly determine whether we are in recession. At about a year out, the AUC is 0.75, which, loosely 
interpreted, means we can correctly sort expansions and recessions with 75% accuracy. At the two-year 
mark the AUC is 0.81, a surprising improvement in accuracy reflecting that the leading indicators are 
well suited for that horizon. 
The American business cycle in international context 
Fluctuations in U.S. economic activity sometimes have an international component. The oil crises after 
OPEC’s oil embargo in 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979 engulfed a large portion of the global 
economy. Although financial crises in advanced economies are rare, they can leap continents and    




borders with tremendous facility, as we learned in 2008. It is tempting to think that such contagion is a 
modern phenomenon. However, using a data set spanning 140 years, Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor 
(2011) have identified five such financial crises. In each case, 9 to 10 countries out of a sample of 14 
advanced economies were dragged into the financial maelstrom. Will the European sovereign debt crisis 
evolve into one of these events? If so, what would be the risks to the U.S. economy? 
The approach we use largely resembles that based on the domestic LEI data discussed earlier. The OECD 
prepares a composite leading indicators (CLI) index for each of its member countries to detect country-
specific turning points (see www.oecd.org/std/cli). These differ for each country depending on data 
availability and each indicator’s ability to project country-specific turning points. 
We examine to what extent international data on leading indicators are able to detect U.S. turning points 
using combined CLI data for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. We begin by 
separating any information that is 
correlated with the U.S. CLI, which is 
calculated by the OECD as well. This 
separation avoids double counting 
information that already appears in 
our domestic LEI analysis. 
Figure 1 displays the U.S. recession 
probabilities calculated with these 
data. The AUC hovers around 0.7 over 
the entire 24-month forecast range. 
Thus, the foreign CLI data provide a 
surprisingly reasonable signal of U.S. 
recessions. In normal times, this signal 
is lower quality than the LEI-based 
signal and would be superseded. But 
what if these are not normal times? 
Calculating recession odds due to domestic and external factors 
Figure 2 shows our updated recession probability forecasts. The thin red line shows the LEI-based 
predictions we calculated in 2010, which run until 2012. The black dashed line shows the LEI-based 
predictions using data through August 2011 and extends until mid-2013. The dotted green line shows the 
predictions based on international CLI data released through July 2011. The thick blue line displays the 
odds of recession based on combining the lines based on domestic and international factors. 
To interpret these predictions, think about an experiment in which two coins are flipped, with heads 
representing recession and tails expansion. One coin represents the recession odds from domestic 
factors, the other coin from international factors. Figure 2 shows the probabilities of flipping heads with 
the domestic and international coins. The overall probability of recession is reflected in the thick blue 
line. 
In the next few months, the odds of recession due to domestic factors appear reasonably contained. 
Those odds increase gradually and reach about 30% in the second half of 2012, after which  
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they decline. However, the curve 
reflecting the international odds 
suggests more imminent danger to the 
economy, although this threat is 
harder to calibrate using historical 
data and only indirectly reflects the 
health of the European financial 
system. Recession odds based on 
international factors peak at about 
45% toward the end of 2011, but 
decline rapidly thereafter. 
The combination of these two 
recession coins, shown in the 
combined risks line of Figure 2, is 
quite disconcerting. It indicates that 
the odds are greater than 50% that we 
will experience a recession sometime early in 2012. Because the international odds of recession are more 
imprecisely estimated, one must be careful with a strict interpretation of this result. But the message is 
clear. Prudence suggests that the fragile state of the U.S. economy would not easily withstand turbulence 
coming across the Atlantic. A European sovereign debt default may well sink the United States back into 
recession. However, if we navigate the storm through the second half of 2012, it appears that danger will 
recede rapidly in 2013. 
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